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ARTICLES
WAIVER: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF A
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PRODUCING DOCUMENTS PROTECTED BY
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Roberta M. Harding*
The inadvertent' production of documents protected by the attorney-
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This Article is dedicated to Edward W. Deitz, a close friend, journalist, three-time Pulitzer
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ual words of encouragement in order to make this Article a reality.
1. The term "inadvertent" is formally defined as that which is "[ulnintentional: acciden-
tal." WEBSTER'S II: NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 352 (1984) (emphasis ad-
ded). The definition focuses upon whether whatever occurred did so without the intent that it
occur. Attempts by case law to define and clarify the term incorporate this perspective. One
example of this is found in International Digital Systems Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120
F.R.D. 445 (D. Mass. 1988), where the court declares that "[t]here is also no dispute that the
disclosure was 'inadvertent,' at least in the sense that it was not an intentional or purposeful
disclosure. " Id. at 446 (emphasis added). Consequently, the definition of inadvertency embod-
ies the view that the disclosure was "not a deliberate act, or even the result of a conscious but
erroneous decision." Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12,
21 (D. Neb. 1985) (emphasis added); see also Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver
Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 207 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (noting that the disclosure of the privi-
leged document "was truly inadvertent and not the product of some conscious but erroneous
decision"); Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege,
82 MICH. L. REV. 598, 598 n.5 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Inadvertent Disclosure] (stating that
"[i]nadvertent disclosure is the unintentional revelation of the contents of a document other-
wise subject to the attorney-client privilege").
In determining whether the disclosure of documents was inadvertent, courts usually rely
upon a host of factors. This approach essentially collapses the definition and proof of inadver-
tency into one inquiry. An attempt to determine whether the definition is met requires delving
Catholic University Law Review
client privilege2 frequently' occurs in contemporary litigation. This phe-
nomena becomes more prevalent as the number of cases involving inadver-
tent document production grows. Unfortunately, given the present modes
into an examination of factors that either tend to support the definition or refute its applica-
tion. See Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 207. For example, in order for the Golden Valley court
to determine whether or not the requisite inadvertency existed, it had to conduct an examina-
tion of an array of factors. Id. The factors perused by the court included: the length and
complexity of discovery; the breadth or narrowness of discovery (local, regional, national or
international); the number of documents produced; the number of documents examined, the
number of documents designated as protected by the attorney-client privilege; and the exist-
ence of any protective orders. Id. Considering all of these factors enables a court to engage in
a more comprehensive determination of the existence of inadvertence. Notwithstanding these
approaches, however, the definition of inadvertency remains imprecise.
2. The federal discovery rules protect against the discovery of matters covered by the
attorney-client privilege. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.
Mass. 1950), provides the following description of the privilege:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to
become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a mem-
ber of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communi-
cation is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for
the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a
crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.
Id. at 358-59; see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2017, at 137-40 (2d ed. 1986). See generally JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292 (1961 & Supp. 1991).
While the protection of the attorney-client privilege extends to all forms of communication,
the scope of this Article is limited to the examination of the inadvertent production of privi-
leged documents, or written communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
394 (1981) (stating that privileged confidences include those memorialized in documents). It
warrants noting that no distinction is made between the degree of protection the attorney-
client privilege affords to oral and written communications. See United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at
358-59 (stating the requirements for assertion of the attorney-client privilege). This emphasis
was selected for this Article because it reflects a situation that is prevelant in today's legal
practice, as evidenced by the substantial body of case law on the topic of this Article. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 641, 645 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (finding
privileged documents inadvertently disclosed); Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 207 (same); see
also Robert J. Franco & Michael E. Prangle, The Inadvertent Waiver of Privilege, 26 TORT &
INS. L.J. 637, 639 n.8 (1991); Note, Inadvertent Disclosure, supra note 1, at 598, 599 & n.8, 600
(1982); James P. Ulwick, Producing By Mistake, LITIGATION, Spring, 1992, at 20-21; infra
note 3 (discussing the nature and prevalence of cases involving the inadvertent production of
privileged documents).
Inadvertently produced documents frequently are afforded dual protection under the work
product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege doctrine. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3); see
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947), superseded by statute as stated in Hawkins v.
District Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 633 P.2d 1372 (Colo. 1982). This Article's analysis
also is limited to an analysis of documents protected by the attorney-client privilege. There-
fore, any protection afforded to documents by the work product doctrine, Rule 26 (b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, will not be addressed.
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for resolving the waiver issue that stems from this occurrence, this occur-
However, it should be noted that under the federal discovery rules, the work product rule is
divided into two categories. The first is tantamount to absolute protection, while the second
provides conditional protection. FED. R. CiV. P. 26(b)(3). The type of protection provided in
the first category-"the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning
the litigation"-is similar to that afforded under the attorney-client privilege. Id. (emphasis
added). Materials protected under this aspect of the work product rule raise issues similar to
those encountered in the context of the attorney-client privilege. As a result, courts generally
opt to examine the waiver consequences of inadvertently produced documents protected by the
work product doctrine in a manner identical to that used to examine inadvertently produced
documents protected by the attorney-client privilege. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey,
109 F.R.D. 323, 328-32 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (finding that inadvertent production test factors
applied to documents protected by the work product doctrine); see also Lois Sportswear,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying inadvertent
production test to documents protected by work product doctrine and attorney-client privi-
lege); Ulwick, supra note 2, at 23.
3. In Pepper's Steel & Alloys, the court acknowledged that with large document produc-
tions "[m]istakes of this type [inadvertent document production] are likely to occur . ..."
Peppers Steel & Alloys, 742 F. Supp. at 645 (emphasis added); FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty
Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 483 (E.D. Va. 1991) (concluding that, despite the parties dis-
pute as to the number of documents produced, "[w]hether the documents numbered 15,000 or
50,000, it cannot be doubted that this was a large document production carrying with it a sub-
stantial risk that privileged documents might be inadvertently disclosed" (emphasis added)). To
illustrate the frequency with which these mistakes occur, the following is a sample of cases
raising the issue of the waiver consequence of inadvertently produced privileged documents: In
re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding mistake with one privileged memo-
randum produced out of many documents); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753
F. Supp. 936, 937 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (finding mistake where the attorneys and paralegal prepared
thousands of pages of documents for inspection and inadvertently included "Exhibit #272...
a transcript of an attorney-client privileged conversation"), aff'd in part, question certified, 991
F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1993); Ray v. Cutter Lab., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 86, 88 (M.D. Fla. 1990)
(finding mistake with one privileged document produced out of 900 pages of produced materi-
als); Pepper's Steel & Alloys, 742 F. Supp. at 643 (noting that more than 100,000 pages were
produced during a document production and four pages contained privileged information);
Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 181 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (noting that plain-
tiff's counsel reviewed approximately 6000 documents in preparation for defendant's inspec-
tion of the documents and between 2500 and 3000 pages of non-privileged documents were
made available for review while one privileged document was produced); Golden Valley, 132
F.R.D. at 207 (finding that from the 90,000 documents examined, 14,000 documents were
produced and one privileged letter was produced); Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone Star Indus.,
132 F.R.D. 558, 560 (D. Kan. 1990) (stating that "[lthe scope of discovery undertaken in this
case also leads us to conclude that a finding of waiver would be inappropriate. More than
9,000 pages of documents were produced, and the documents in question were only eight pages
contained in one of 118 personnel files [produced]."), sum. judgment granted, No. 88-2431-V,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18669 (D. Kan. Dec. 19, 1991), aff'd, 982 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1992);
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 172
(D. Kan. 1989) (noting that three privileged documents were produced in a total production of
500,000 pages); Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Bass, No. CIV.A.88-5257, 1989 WL 9354 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 8, 1989) (finding 11 privileged documents produced in a document request involving nu-
merous documents); International Digital Sys., 120 F.R.D. at 446 (noting that of the 500,000
documents perused in response to the document request, 20 privileged documents were in-
cluded in the production); In re Consolidated Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition
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rence could threaten to become the rule rather than the exception.4 The
increased frequency of inadvertent document production is due primarily to
more disputes arising out of production of documents5 demands by the op-
posing party that emerge as parties request the production of an increasing
number of responsive documents. 6 As a result, the sheer quantity of docu-
ments being produced facilitates the inadvertent production of materials pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege.
When privileged documents are inadvertently produced, a multitude of
problems and issues emerge.7 One of the most critical issues is whether the
inadvertent production of protected documents requires a waiver' of the
of Wis. Steel, 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (noting that more than one privileged
document was included in a production of 100,000 documents); Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc. v.
Abbott Lab., 117 F.R.D. 119, 121 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (finding only one privileged document out
of eight boxes of documents produced to the opponent); Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 207-08 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (finding several dozen privi-
leged documents were produced out of an extensive document production); Standard
Chartered Bank PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings (U.S.), Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(discovering only one sentence protected by the attorney-client privilege in a 5 page document
that was produced along with over 1,000 pages of non-privileged documents); Lois Sportswear,
104 F.R.D. at 104 (explaining that out of 30,000 pages of documents reviewed, approximately
16,000 pages were produced and 22 of these documents were privileged); Eigenheim Bank v.
Halpern, 598 F. Supp. 988, 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that out of 712 pages of documents
and 30 additional documents produced, only one was privileged); Kansas-Nebraska Natural
Gas, 109 F.R.D. at 21 (stating that of the more than "75,000 documents ... produced in
response to Marathon's first request for the production of documents" only one was privi-
leged); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954-55 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (stating
that only four privileged letters were produced out of 28 files); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman,
Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (noting that "apparently [a] voluminous amount
of discovery [was] involved") (emphasis added); see also Note, Inadvertent Disclosure, supra
note 1, at 599.
4. See supra note 3.
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
6. See supra note 3.
7. See infra and notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
8. Once a court decides that the inadvertent production of privileged materials waives
the attorney-client privilege, it still must determine the scope of the waiver. See generally
Franco & Prangle, supra note 2, at 637; Note, Inadvertent Disclosure, supra note 1, at 603-04
n.26. Most courts select one of four approaches to resolve the scope of the waiver issue: 1)
specific documents in issue; 2) documents on the same subject matter; 3) documents relating to
the same subject matter; and 4) documents on the same general subject matter.
Under the first approach, some courts hold that "[iun a proper case of inadvertent disclosure,
the waiver should cover only the specific document in issue." Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc.
v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 52 (M.D. N.C. 1987) (emphasis
added), aff'd, 878 F.2d. 801 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & Newall,
137 F.R.D. 178, 182 (D. Mass. 1991); Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Pop-
corn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. Ind. 1990); International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 450 (D. Mass. 1988). Thus, the waiver of the privilege is lim-
ited to the documents actually produced. This approach benefits the producing party, because
while the non-producing party is granted access to some privileged matter documents, the
[Vol. 42:465
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documents' attorney-client privilege. Presently, federal courts apply three
producing party does not run the risk of being required to produce additional privileged matter
that could have disastrous results.
Other courts have held that the waiver covers only materials on the same specific subject-
matter as the produced document(s). See, e.g., Prudential, 137 F.R.D. at 183 (refusing to find
a subject matter waiver despite the attorney-client privilege being waived); Perrignon v. Bergen
Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412
F. Supp. 286, 289 (N.D. Ill. 1976); see also FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138
F.R.D. 479, 484 (E.D. Va. 1991); Standard Chartered Bank PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings
(U.S.), Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that "[i]t is true that the voluntary
production of a privileged document effects a waiver of the privilege as to all other privileged
communications concerning the same subject matter") (emphasis added); 4 JAMES W. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 26.60[2], at 26-174 to 26-176 (1993); Note, Inadver-
tent Disclosure, supra note 1, at 603 n.26. Under this scenario, the party is at risk of producing
some privileged documents, but perhaps not enough that would prove fatal to the case. Thus,
the approach seems to strive to balance the policies of preventing strategic partial disclosure
and encouraging attorney-client communication. It also attempts to overcome the dangers
inherent in the more encompassing "relating to the same subject matter" test.
In In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court considered the scope of the
waiver test based upon a broader" 'same subject matter' " standard. Id. at 980-81 (quoting In
re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Under this standard the scope of the
waiver of the attorney-client privilege encompasses " 'all other communications relating to the
same subject matter.'" Id. at 981 (quoting Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 809) (emphasis added).
This approach, however, possesses the obvious inherent difficulty in defining what constitutes
"relating to the same subject matter." See id. (stating that "the 'subject matter' of the waiver
could ... be defined in a number of different ways").
Difficulties associated with defining and applying the standard in order to identify the addi-
tional documents required to be produced also places the producing party in a precarious
position. The producing party's potentially dangerous position is largely attributed to the un-
certainty in accurately determining what constitutes "relating to the same subject matter,"
which places the producing party in the position of possibly providing more privileged docu-
ments than is actually necessary. This, in turn, could impact the pre-trial and trial strategies of
the producing party and reduce its bargaining-power in any attempt to settle the case. It could
also trigger the production of documents that are properly protected by the attorney-client
privilege and then another waiver battle would ensue.
Lastly, at least one court suggests that the scope of the waiver may result in a waiver that
encompasses all documents on the same general subject-matter. See Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at
980-981. While such a broad scope was not deemed mandatory by this particular court, id., a
producing party still runs the theoretical risk of being subject to this waiver standard. The
obvious danger with this standard, from the producing party's position, is the risk that critical
elements of its case could be revealed to the opposition. Thus, a potential consequence could
be that the producing party might be "coerced" into settling the case on unfavorable terms, or
going to trial and risk an unfavorable outcome. Another adverse consequence of this outcome
is that it exceeds the goals of discovery and defeats the basic purpose of the adversarial process.
See infra note 83 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, at least one court did find full subject
matter waiver, following the suggestion in Sealed Case. See United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 132 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1990). It should be noted that one important rationale proferred
by the court for this result was the party's refusal to cooperate in the discovery process. Id.
This suggests that the decision to apply a broad scope of the waiver standard might be influ-
enced by an interest in penalizing a recalcitrant party.
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diverse tests-the lenient test, the strict test, and the middle test 9-to deter-
mine whether a waiver results from inadvertent production. In response to
this situation, this Article favors the development and implementation of an
alternative test that draws from the strengths of the existing tests and mini-
mizes their inherent weaknesses.
This Article first examines the three tests federal courts currently apply to
the issue of attorney-client privilege in connection with inadvertent docu-
ment production. This Article also considers the problems caused by the
courts' use of three different rules, including the increased uncertainty in the
litigation process resulting from the lack of uniformity ° among the federal
district and circuit courts in deciding this issue; the increased risk of forum
shopping;" the unnecessary expenditure of personal and judicial re-
sources;12 the uncertainty as to the scope of the waiver if the privilege is
deemed waived;1 3 and the ensuing frustrations in using this waiver as a tool
to "police" attorneys' activities. 4
This Article goes on to examine the two major legal principles in conflict
in this issue. An alternative test is proposed that is intended to be applied
uniformly to the issue of inadvertent document production and waiver of
privilege. The alternative test's strengths and weaknesses are also critiqued.
Lastly, this Article compares the alternative test to each of the existing three
tests and concludes that the new test draws upon the strengths of each of the
three existing tests, while minimizing the existing doctrinal tension between
discovery policy and attorney-client privilege.
9. See, e.g., Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 182-84 (N.D. Cal.
1990) (middle test); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954-55 (N.D. I11.
1982) (lenient test); Rockland Indus. v. Frank Kasmir Assocs., 470 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D.
Tex. 1979) (strict test). See generally Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F.
Supp. 936, 937-38 (S.D. Fla. 1991), aff'd in part, question certified, 991 F.2d 1533 (1 1th Cir.
1993); Prudential, 137 F.R.D. at 182; Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 208-09; see also infra notes
15-32 and accompanying text.
10. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 573 F.2d 646, 650-52 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting
a decisive split among courts deciding which test to apply to situations involving inadvertently
produced privileged documents); International Digital, 120 F.R.D. at 448 (commenting on the
fact that the law on inadvertent waiver lacks uniformity); see also Georgetown Manor, 753 F.
Supp. at 937-9 n.4; Ray v. Cutter Lab., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 86, 87 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Golden
Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 208-9; Ulwick, supra note 3, at 23; Appendices, Table 1. See generally
Appendices, Chart B.
11. See infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text; see also Appendices, Chart B.
12. See United States v. Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 641, 645 (S.D. Fla.
1990); infra note 171 and accompanying text.
13. See supra note 8; infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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I. THE CURRENT APPROACHES
Federal circuit courts of appeal and district courts currently employ three
tests for deciding whether the inadvertent production of a privileged docu-
ment waives the attorney-client privilege. This section discusses the three
tests and considers the problems that arise from having three different ap-
proaches. The conflict between the liberal discovery policy and the attorney-
client privilege also is presented in this section.
A. The Three Tests
1. The "Lenient Test"
The lenient test, at its most basic level, states that "mere inadvertent pro-
duction [of privileged documents] does not waive the [attorney-client] privi-
lege."' 5 The rationale for this test rests on the belief that "because the
disclosure was inadvertent, there was no intention to waive the privilege, and
one cannot waive the privilege without intending to do so."' 6 While the leni-
ent standard has been adopted by several courts,' 7 it is not the majority
test.' 8 The test has essentially one criterion: were documents protected by
the attorney-client privilege produced to the opponent?' 9 This criterion does
not require any investigation into the circumstances of the production of the
15. Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954 (N.D. 111. 1982) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F.
Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (citing Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 954), aff'd in part, ques-
tion certified, 991 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1993)); Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp.
1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990), sum. judgment granted in part, dismissed in part, 742 F. Supp. 860
(D. Del. 1990), superseded by statute as stated in Young v. West Coast Indus. Relations Ass'n,
144 F.R.D. 206 (D. Del 1992); Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co.,
132 F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Bass, No. CIV.A.88-5257, 1989
WL 9354 (E.D. Penn. Feb. 8, 1989); see also infra notes 143-52 (comparing the alternative test
with the lenient test).
16. Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 208 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Ge-
orgetown Manor, 753 F. Supp. at 938; Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955; Kansas-Nebraska
Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D. Neb. 1985); see also Fidelity
Bank, 1989 WL 9354, at *1; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding that there must be evidence that the client intended to waive the
privilege); WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 545 (stating that "[t]he policy of the privilege
has been plainly grounded since the latter part of the 1700s on subjective considerations....
[H]ence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent. Such is the
modern theory." (emphasis added)); infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
17. See Appendices, Table 1.
18. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 329, 332 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(explaining that the rule in Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 951 [the lenient test], is a minority
rule); see also Franco & Prango, supra note 2, at 649 (discussing the majority rule that inadver-
tent disclosure may constitute a waiver); infra note 25 and accompanying text.
19. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas, 109 F.R.D. at 20-21; see, e.g., Helman, 728 F. Supp. at
1104; Fidelity Bank, 1989 WL 9354; Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 954; see also Connecticut
Mutual, 18 F.R.D. at 451 (holding that there must be intent to waive the privilege). In addi-
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documents at issue. Therefore, technically, the outcome is not influenced by
whether the production occured accidentally or intentionally. Conse-
quently, if the disclosed documents are deemed protected by the attorney-
client privilege,20 then the privilege is not waived by inadvertently producing
the documents.
2. The "Strict Test"
Under the strict test, the "disclosure of documents protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege in the course of pre-trial discovery in which documents
are being produced pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, operates
as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege [even] as to any documents dis-
closed by 'inadvertence.' "2 Like the lenient test, the strict test does not
require an inquiry into whether or not the privileged document was inadver-
tently produced.22 As a result, "inadvertency," a critical component of the
tion, it is the party claiming the protection of the attorney-client privilege who has the burden
of proof on the issue. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas, 109 F.R.D. at 20.
20. See Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas, 109 F.R.D. at 20 (explaining that the first question
is whether the attorney-client privilege is applicable); Ranney-Brown Distribs., Inc. v. E.T.
Barwick Indus., 75 F.R.D. 3, 6-7 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (ordering an in camera review in a claim
for inadvertent production of documents to determine if the documents were protected by the
attorney-client privilege); Franco & Prangle, supra note 2, at 638 (stating that disclosed com-
munications must be privileged); Ulwick, supra note 3, at 22 (holding that the document was
not protected by the privilege).
21. International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 450 (D.
Mass. 1988) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Rockland Indus. v. Frank Kasmir
Assocs., 470 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that the attorney-client privilege
was conclusively waived when privileged documents were produced along with non-privileged
documents during discovery). In International Digital Systems, 120 F.R.D. at 445, the plain-
tiff moved for a protective order requiring the defendant to return twenty privileged docu-
ments that had been inadvertently produced during document production. Id. at 446. It is
interesting to note that in denying the plaintiff's request, the court applied the strict test de-
spite its noting that the documents had been inadvertently produced, thereby engaging in an
inquiry not germane to strict test cases. Id. at 450. Some strict test cases have, however,
applied traditional "inadvertency" factors. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & Newell, PLC, 137 F.R.D. 178, 182 (D. Mass. 1991); In re
Standard Fin. Management Corp., 77 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (dicta); Liggett
Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 208 (M.D.N.C. 1986);
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1976). Therefore, a
hybrid strict test might be emerging. Perhaps this test is a mere reflection of the trend to adopt
the middle test. See also In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding the
attorney-client privilege to be waived even if documents were inadvertently produced);
Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prods., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 237, 243 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (same).
22. See International Digital Sys., 120 F.R.D. at 449-50; Rockland Indu., 470 F. Supp. at
1181 (finding the "[p]rivilege was conclusively waived... when the document was included
with others submitted to Kasmir during its discovery of this action" (citation omitted) (em-
phasis added)); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549
(D.D.C. 1970) (applying the strict test with the focus by the court on the "objective fact" that




alternative test as embodied in its rebuttable presumption component,23 has
no role in the strict test. The central inquiry of the strict test, therefore, is
whether or not documents produced to the opposing party were protected by
the attorney-client privilege.24
3. The "Middle Test"
Under the middle test, inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents
may give rise to a waiver. 25 Unlike the lenient and strict tests, the mid-
dle test requires a multi-prong analysis. The analysis used in applying
the middle test is composed of three factors: (i) the existence of privi-
leged documents; (ii) whether the privileged documents were inadver-
tently produced; and (iii) whether the inadvertent production results
in non-waiver of the privilege.26 Furthermore, under the middle test, the
producing party has the burden of proving all three factors.27 This
23. See infra Part II.A. and accompanying notes.
24. In International Digital Systems, the court, in applying the strict test, focused on two
key components: whether the documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege and
whether the documents were actually produced. International Digital Sys., 120 F.R.D. at 446;
see, e.g., Thomas, 672 F. Supp. at 243 (stating that the strict test applies to those documents
that are protected by the attorney-client privilege); In re Standard Fin., 77 B.R. at 330 (stating
that the strict test would have applied except that the documents were not protected by the
attorney-client privilege); see also Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91
F.R.D. 254, 256-57 (N.D. Il. 1988) (finding that documents were not protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege because they were found in a trash bin located outside the building); Rock-
land Indus, 470 F. Supp. at 1181 (stating that the initial inquiry in the application of the
strict test is whether or not the attorney-client privilege is applicable, while the second is
whether "the document[s] [were] included with others submitted.., during... discovery of
this action"); Ulwick, supra note 3, at 20-22 (discussing an example referring to documents
that were not protected by the attorney-client privilege).
25. Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th
Cir. 1981); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 183 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Golden
Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. Ind. 1990);
Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone Star Indus., 132 F.R.D. 558, 560 (D. Kan. 1990), sum. judg-
ment granted, No. 88-2431-V, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18669 (D. Kan Dec. 19, 1991), aff'd,
982 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1992); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal
Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 174 (D. Kan. 1989); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey,
109 F.R.D 323, 329 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (finding a waiver in the context of documents protected
by the work-product doctrine).
26. Weil, 647 F.2d. at 25; Lois Sportswear U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D.
103, 105-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Bud Antle, 131 F.R.D. at 179; Monarch Cement, 132
F.R.D. at 558; Baker's Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., No. CV87-0937, 1988 WL 138254
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1988).
27. See Golden Valley, 132 F.R.D. at 207 (holding that "[w]hen the producing party
claims inadvertent disclosure it has the burden of proving that the disclosure was truly inad-
vertent, and that the privilege has not been waived" (citation omitted) (emphasis added));
Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D.
46, 50 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (holding that when privileged documents are produced, the producing
party "bears the burden on [proving] the inadvertency and waiver issues") aff'd, 878 F.2d 801
(4th Cir. 1989); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 20
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test is presently used by a majority of the courts that have ruled on the
28issue.
The middle test is probably more problematic as it also recognizes the
increased possibility that privileged documents might be produced simulta-
neously with non-privileged documents.29 Given this reality, the middle test
scrutinizes the circumstances surrounding the document production process
and makes a determination as to whether or not the privilege has been
waived. The middle test, as set forth in the seminal Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-
Tech, Inc. 3 case, includes five factors that should be considered in order to
assess the waiver consequences of inadvertent production:
1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken during document
production;
2) the time taken to fix the error;
3) the scope of the document request;
4) the extent of the document request; and
5) fairness.3 '
If, after these factors are examined and it is determined that an attorney
was not negligent in producing the documents, then the producing party will
not have waived the privilege. On the other hand, if the circumstances indi-
cate that an attorney "threw all caution to the wind," then the privilege
might be deemed to have been waived. Theoretically, this flexibility in the
application of the test should result in more equitable results.
B. The Problems of Nonuniform Rules
The use of three tests, instead of a uniform approach, has created a diffi-
cult and confusing situation, plagued by problems.32 One critical problem is
that district courts have been provided with essentially no guidance by
(D. Neb. 1985) (holding that the producing party must prove that the documents are protected
by the attorney-client privilege and that the privilege was not waived).
28. Ray v. Cutter Lab., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 86, 87 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (noting that current
cases tend to favor the multi-factor middle test); Kansas City Power, 133 F.R.D. at 174 (stating
that the middle test is the current trend) see Appendices, Table 1.
29. FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 481 (E.D. Va. 1991)
(acknowledging that with large document productions, there is a substantial risk that privi-
leged documents might be inadvertently "disclosed"); United States v. Pepper's Steel & Alloys,
Inc., 742 F. Supp. 641, 643 (S.D. Fla. 1990). See generally supra notes 1-2 and accompanying
text.
30. Bud Antle, 131 F.R.D. at 183; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D.
323 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
31. Bud Antle, 131 F.R.D. at 183. The alternative test proposed in this Article excludes
the time factor. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusion of the
time factor in the alternative test).
32. See Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 480 (stating that the issue of the inadvertent
disclosure of privileged documents is a "knotty question"); Appendices, Chart B and Table 1.
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cirucit courts of appeal. This lack of guidance leads to a situation whereby
litigants are unsure as to how document production should be conducted in
order to avoid the pitfall of waiving the privilege.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia is the only federal court of appeals that has expressly selected one of
the three existing tests to resolve the situation. While it has adopted the
strict test, other circuits have not been so clear in their rulings.3 a
An examination of the case law supports the conclusion that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit would probably reject both the
strict and lenient tests in favor of the middle test.34 In Weil v. Investment/
Indicators, Research & Management,35 the appellant objected to the lower
court's finding that, due to the existence of the attorney-client privilege, the
appellee was not required to respond to certain questions asked by the appel-
lant during discovery. 36 Though the appellee arguably did not intend to
waive the privilege, he had previously disclosed the contested information.37
In reversing the lower court's decision, the Weil court noted that "the sub-
jective intent of the party asserting the privilege is only one factor to be con-
sidered in determining whether waiver should be implied."' 31 In addition,
the court found that " 'inadvertence' of disclosure does not as a matter of
law prevent the occurrence of waiver."39 The Ninth Circuit's Weil decision
supports the view that it would likely adopt the middle test, since the deci-
sion's language is consistent with how the middle test is defined. 4' This con-
clusion is bolstered by the fact that the middle test has been adopted by
several district courts in the Ninth Circuit.4 It warrants noting, however,
that those district courts have not cited Weil as precedent for their adoption
of the middle test.42
33. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. 1989); see Appendices, Chart A and Table 1. It
can be argued, however, that the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Fourth
Circuits have implicitly adopted the middle and strict tests respectively.
34. 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 24 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The subjective intent of the disclosing
party is one of the criteria examined in the application of the middle test. See infra part III.C.
and accompanying notes.
39. Weil, 647 F.2d at 24 (citations omitted). This excerpt describes the rationale behind
middle test. See infra part III.C. and accompanying notes.
40. See infra part III.C. and accompanying notes.
41. Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179 (E.D. Cal
1991); see Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179 (N.D. Cal. 1990); see also
Appendices, Table 1.
42. See, e.g., Bud Antle, 131 F.R.D. at 179 (applying the middle test but not citing Weil,
647 F.2d at 18, as precedent for the adoption of this test).
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An example of the Ninth Circuit's district courts' adoption of the middle
test is the United States District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia decision in Bud Antle.43 This case is considered the seminal district
court case articulating the middle test. The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California also adopted the middle test44 in Eureka
Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 45 The circumstances in
which it adopted the test, however, are significantly different from those
upon which this Article focuses. 46 The court's opinion in Eureka noted that
it "believes that an analysis of whether a waiver of important privileges has
been effected should be analyzed under the inadvertent waiver standard on a
case-by-case basis. ' 47 The Eureka court went on to note that "even the in-
advertent disclosure of a privileged communication does not prevent the oc-
currence of a waiver. ' '4' These two references by the Eureka court are
alternative ways of describing the middle test.49 In deciding that the privi-
lege was waived, the Eureka court also relied upon the factors cited in Bud
Antle.50 Thus, although the Eureka holding was made in a different context,
it provides additional support for the contention that the Ninth Circuit
would opt for the middle test.
The situation in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
is more complex. One district court in the Fourth Circuit has held that the
Fourth Circuit adopted the middle test to resolve the inadvertency issue.5
In that case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia noted that the middle test is "a rule that the Fourth Circuit appar-
43. Id. at 179. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1985),
is frequently cited as the pivotal case in the development of the middle test. While Hartford
does discuss and scrutinize the pros and cons of the lenient and strict tests, the case was
decided in the context of the inadvertent production of documents subject to work product
immunity protection and not attorney-client privilege protection. Id. at 328-29. The Bud An-
tie decision, however, relies upon the Hartford rationale. Bud Antie, 131 F.R.D. at 183. As
previously noted, many courts do not use the work product doctrine or the attorney-client
privilege as a means for determining how to resolve the dilemma. See supra note 2; supra note
42 and accompanying text.
44. Eureka Financial, 136 F.R.D. 179, 183-84 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
45. Id.
46. In Eureka, the non-producing party (Hartford) based its "blanket objection" to a
request for documents upon the exercise of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 182. Hartford
agreed to produce the requested documents with the exception of those protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege. The case did not involve the production of responsive documents that
inadvertently included privileged materials. Id.
47. Id. at 183 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 184 (citation omitted).
49. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
50. Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 183 (N.D. Cal. 1990).




ently has adopted."52 The district court, in FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty
Credit Corp., 53 noted that "[w]hile it appears that the Fourth Circuit es-
chews the extremes and follows the middle road on the inadvertent disclo-
sure-waiver issue, no circuit opinion includes extensive guidance on what
types of inadvertent disclosures amount to waiver."54 The court cited In re
Grand Jury Proceedings " in support of its opinion.
A close reading of In re Grand Jury Proceedings, however, reveals that the
Marine Midland court may have been premature in proclaiming that the
Fourth Circuit adopted the middle test.56 While the In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings court discusses the strict and the middle tests,5 7 it notes that, as the
documents at issue were not protected by the attorney-client privilege, it was
unnecessary to address the issue of inadvertent disclosure.5" Thus, any gui-
dance that In re Grand Jury Proceedings might provide in determining
which of the three tests the Fourth Circuit endorses, is dicta.
Perhaps more revealing is that the language used by the court in In re
Grand Jury Proceedings suggests that the Fourth Circuit favors adopting the
strict test. An example is found in the same paragraph that Marine Midland
relies upon for concluding that the Fourth Circuit "apparently" adopts the
middle test. In that paragraph the court notes that "[i]n fact, so strong is
this requirement of confidentiality that it has been held that the privilege
may be lost 'even if the disclosure is inadvertent.' "" This statement reflects
the generally accepted definition of the strict test 6° and, as such, suggests
that the Fourth Circuit prefers the strict test. Furthermore, the In re Grand
Jury Proceedings court relies upon United States v. Jones 61 for its conclusion
that the documents at issue were not protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege.62 In Jones, the Fourth Circuit noted that "[any disclosure inconsistent
with maintaining the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship
waives the attorney-client privilege."' 6' Again we see a Fourth Circuit opin-
ion containing language indicative of the strict test.64 Given these considera-
52. Id. at 482.
53. 138 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Va. 1991).
54. Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
55. 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984).
56. Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d at 1358.
57. Id. at 1356.
58. Id. at 1358.
59. Id. at 1356 (quoting Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D.
254, 258-59 (N.D. Ill. 1981)) (emphasis added).
60. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
61. 696 F.2d 1069 (4th Cir. 1982).
62. Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d at 1356.
63. Jones, 696 F.2d at 1072 (emphasis added).
64. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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tions, the Marine Midland court may have incorrectly concluded that the
Fourth Circuit embraces the middle test.
The confusion surrounding the waiver consequence problem is com-
pounded by the absence of any Supreme Court guidance on the issue. The
Court denied review of In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transport,65
a case which would have given it the opportunity to clarify which test should
be used and thereby determine if waiver is a consequence. At the court of
appeals level, the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the attorney-client privilege
was waived as to the inadvertently produced documents.66 In finding the
privilege to have been waived, the District of Columbia Circuit appeared to
apply the middle test, as it noted that objective factors and subjective intent
must be examined. 67  Thus, the court necessarily examined the circum-
stances surrounding the production of the privileged documents. 6' This in-
quiry is a central feature of the middle test.69
The federal courts' different approaches to the inadvertent disclosure
waiver consequence issue is also of critical importance because it necessarily
influences parties' selection of venue, thereby increasing the potential for fo-
rum shopping to occur.7" Ever since Erie Railroad v. Tompkins71 was de-
cided over fifty years ago, it has been emphatically impressed upon all
litigants that forum shopping is severely frowned upon. The situation in the
New York district courts illustrates that abusive forum shopping can result
from the existence of diverse tests to resolve the inadvertent disclosure
issue.72
65. 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States,
444 U.S. 915 (1979).
66. Id. at 675.
67. Id. at 674-75; see also supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
68. Approximately ten years later, in In re Sealed, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the middle test
that it had previously adopted in Ocean Transport, 604 F.2d at 674-75, and instead applied the
strict test. See Sealed, 877 F.2d at 980 (stating the court's agreement "with those courts which
have held that the privilege is lost 'even if the disclosure is inadvertent' " (quoting In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted)). These actions by
the appeals court only add to the district courts' frustration in seeking guidance on the issue.
See Appendices, Table 1; supra notes 15-31.
69. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
70. Venue is "the district in which the suit is brought." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1557
(6th ed. 1990). Within each circuit there are several different districts and places of venue. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 34; see also Note, Inadvertent Disclosure, supra note 1, at 598-99 & nn. 8-11.
71. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
72. See Appendices, Chart B. These district courts are within the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988). The pictorial depiction of the situation
illustrates the practical implications of this disparity. See Appendices, Chart B.
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Before analyzing this illustrative example, it must be recognized that ordi-
narily an attorney can readily determine, upon his or her first encounter with
a case, whether or not the case will be "document intensive." Attorneys also
are aware of the real possibility that one or more privileged documents may
"slip[ ] through the cracks"7 3 and be inadvertently disclosed to the oppo-
nent. This reality can potentially affect the case from the outset by influenc-
ing the decision where to file the action.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not
adopted a single test to be uniformly applied by all the district courts, in-
cluding those located in New York, within the circuit.74 While New York is
divided into four districts,75 only the Eastern and Southern Districts of New
York have adopted tests to resolve controversies regarding the inadvertent
production of privileged documents. The Eastern District has selected the
middle test,7 6 while the Southern District has adopted the middle and leni-
ent tests.77 Therefore, since it is possible that the Southern District might
apply the lenient test, the better trial strategy in a "document intensive" case
would be, if possible, to bring the action in the Southern District. This view
is bolstered by the great possibility78 of inadvertently producing privileged
documents. Thus, it is better to be safe at the outset than sorry on the way
back from the courthouse.79
Of course, opposing counsel may also possess some degree of foresight,
and may not object to venue in the Southern District because his or her
client also may be in a situation where they would want to benefit from the
lenient test. On the other hand, opposing counsel may attempt to transfer
venue ° to the Eastern District where it is certain that the middle test would
be applied. This way, if the opposing side inadvertently produces privileged
73. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D. Neb.
1985); see also FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 483 (E.D. Va.
1991) ("[I]t cannot be doubted that this was a large document production carrying with it a
substantial risk that privileged documents might be inadvertently disclosed . (emphasis
added)).
74. See Appendices, Chart B and Table I.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1988); see Chart B.
76. Baker's Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., No. CV87-0937, 1988 WL 138254
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1988).
77. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (middle test); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (lenient test).
78. See supra note 3. See generally FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138
F.R.D. 479, 483 (E.D. Va. 1991) (stating that there was a "substantial risk that privileged
documents might be inadvertently disclosed").
79. See infra note 159.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988).
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documents, this attorney increases his or her odds of successfully arguing
that waiver has occurred.81
Lastly, in preparation for a motion to transfer venue, an attorney may
oppose such a transfer of venue. The ensuing series of motions to determine
venue will be partially due to the impact the various inadvertent production
tests have on litigation strategy. In the absence of any one test applied in all
four districts, this scenario could be played out to the extent that excessive
judicial and personal resources are spent. 2 Forum shopping and the unnec-
essary waste of resources are, therefore, inevitable problems resulting from
the unresolved issue of inadvertent disclosure-waiver.
C. The Conflict Between Discovery Policy and Attorney-Client Privilege
There are two conflicting legal doctrines underlying the issue of inadver-
tent document production: the discovery policy83 of the Federal Rules of
81. See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
82. See United States v. Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 641, 645 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (stating that "[i]t is unfortunate that... the Court was forced to expend a great deal of
time on .. .this matter"). See generally Ulwick, supra note 3, at 20.
83. Discovery is a critical aspect of the American judicial system. Its function is to obtain
information on issues and facts pertaining to a legal controversy. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
Discovery essentially has three main purposes: (i) preserving relevant information that may be
unavailable at the time of trial; (ii) ascertaining and refining the actual disputed issues; and (iii)
enabling parties to obtain information that will lead to evidence admissible at trial. See, e.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.1 (1985).
Thus, the overall objective of discovery is to facilitate the truth-finding function of the judicial
system. Nutt v. Black Hills Stage Lines, Inc., 452 F.2d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 1971) (commenting
that "[tihe federal discovery rules were designed to provide each party with the fullest pre-trial
knowledge of the facts and to clarify and narrow the issues to be tried"); FDIC v. Cherry,
Bekaert & Holland, 131 F.R.D. 202, 204 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that "[tihe aim of the
liberal discovery rules is to make trial 'less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair con-
test'" (quoting Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1346 (5th Cir. 1978))); Alimenta
(U.S.A.), Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 99 F.R.D. 309, 312 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (stating that
"[tihe purposes of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to disclose the real
points of dispute between the parties and to afford an adequate factual basis in preparation for
trial" (citation omitted)); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 70 F.R.D. 326, 332 (D.R.I. 1976) (noting
that "[t]he purpose of these rules [FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37] is to provide a way, consistent with
recognized privileges, 'for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and
facts before trial'" (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947), superseded by stat-
ute on other grounds as stated in Hawkins v. Dist. Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 638 P.2d
1372 (Colo. 1982))); Carlson Cos. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1100 (D.
Minn. 1974) (stating that "[i]t is undeniable that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gov-
erning discovery should serve to clarify and confine the issues to be litigated and to reveal to
the parties and the Court the existence or whereabouts of facts relative to those issues" (cita-
tions omitted)); Woldum v. Roverud Construction, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 420, 420 (N.D. Iowa 1968)
(stating that "[t]he overriding purpose of the federal discovery rules is to promote full disclo-
sure of all facts to aid in the fair, prompt and inexpensive disposition of lawsuits"); Wood v.
Todd Shipyards, 45 F.R.D. 363, 364 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (specifying that "[t]he purpose [sic] of
discovery procedures are (1) to narrow the issues; (2) to obtain evidence for use at trial; and (3)
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to secure information as to the existence of evidence that may be used at trial" (citation omit-
ted)); Metropolis Bending Co. v. Brandwen, 8 F.R.D. 296, 297 (D. Pa. 1948) ("To the plead-
ings is assigned the task of general notice giving, whereas narrowing and clarifying the basic
issues between the parties, [and] ascertaining the facts or information as to the existence or
whereabouts of facts relative to those issues is the role of the deposition-discovery process
aided by the pre-trial hearing." (citation omitted)). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
Furthermore, discovery is a necessary corollary to an adjudication system, like our federal
system, premised upon the notice pleading system. Thus, the adoption of the notice pleading
system is one of the main reasons for the liberal construction of the federal discovery rules.
See generally Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); Hickman, 329 U.S. at 495 (finding
that discovery rules are to be liberally construed); Patten v. Dennis, 134 F.2d. 137 (9th Cir.
1943); Alimenta, 99 F.R.D. at 309; In re Boland, 79 F.R.D. 665 (D.D.C. 1978); Harrel v.
Directors of Bureau of Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs, 70 F.R.D. 444 (E.D. Tenn. 1975);
Klausen v. Sidney Printing & Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 783 (D. Kan. 1967); Simmons Co.
v. Cantor, 3 F.R.D. 281 (D. Pa. 1943) (noting that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "are
quite lenient"); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 7.2. There are several reasons for this
posture of the notice pleading system. First, the evolution of discovery has resulted in the
adoption of a liberal policy. From a historical point of view, the modem liberal discovery
policy is a natural result of the switch from the previous complex common law pleading system
to today's simpler notice pleading system. For example, under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a complaint "shall contain" a short and plain statement of the grounds for
subject matter jurisdiction, a statement of the grounds for relief, and a claim for the type of
relief the complaint is requesting. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a).
Under the common law pleading system, litigants were required to include the entire case in
the pleadings. See, e.g. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500 (noting that "[u]nder the prior federal prac-
tice, the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation were per-
formed primarily and inadequately by the pleadings" (footnote omitted)); Floe v. Plowden, 10
F.R.D. 514, 515 (D.S.C. 1950) (noting that "our procedural forms came from the old common
law practice wherein much legal learning and expenditure of time was used up in determining
whether a suit should be brought on the theory of ex contractu or ex delicto"); Battin Amuse-
ment Co. v. Cocalis Amusement Co., 1 F.R.D. 769, 770 (D.N.J. 1941) (finding that "[t]o
ascertain the facts the broad rules of discovery supersede the practice of framing issues by the
pleadings" (footnote omitted)); see also F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY (1909), reprinted in THE
FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1962). See
generally William W. Blume, The Scope of a Civil Action, 42 MICH. L. REV. 257 (1943). Be-
cause the entire case was set forth in the pleadings, under the common law system, the plead-
ings were the pivotal component of any action. Id. at 257. In the mid-1800s, a movement
began advocating a shift from the common law pleading system to another type of pleading
system due to inadequacies observed in the operation of the common law pleading system.
The notice pleading system, which emphasizes giving general notice to the parties vis-d-vis
the initial pleadings, was selected to be the substitute for the common law pleading system.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a). The notice pleading system was touted as a superior pleading mech-
anism because it was less technical and much simpler. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(e)(l). Thus, pusuant
to the mandate of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is only required to
set forth a bare-bones complaint. In general, the notice pleading test requires that the essen-
tial, material facts be disclosed in a general statement such that the responding party can
fashion a response to the allegations contained in the complaint. FED. R. Civ. P. 8; Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
Given that the notice pleading system, unlike the common law pleading system, does not
require full and detailed disclosure of the basis for the facts and legal theories when the case
originates, it was necessary to find a means of augmenting this component of the defunct com-
mon law pleading system. The device selected to fill this new vacuum was discovery. Discov-
1993]
482 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 42:465
Civil Procedure and the attorney-client privilege.8 4 These two important
ery under the previous common law pleading system was virtually unknown because there was
no role for it to play in the litigation process.
While the adoption of the notice pleading system was an impetus for the creation of the
modem liberal discovery system, one must not lose sight of the fact that a critical concern was
developing a means of obtaining the truth. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that a "just...
determination of every action" is one of the goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see
also infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. While the modern discovery system can cer-
tainly accomplish this goal, there are still dangers accompanying the benefit of a liberal discov-
ery policy. The most obvious problems in our liberal truth-finding scheme include: the
creation of a situation in which the cry of "fishing expedition" may no longer warrant the
court's attention or concern and the great expense inherent in utilizing the discovery tools. See
Pepper's Steel & Alloys, 742 F. Supp. at 641 (noting the judicial resources used in enabling
discovery tools to be used by litigants). For better or worse, the liberal discovery system con-
tinues to be a vital component of the modern pleading and adjudication process.
84. The attorney-client privilege is only one of several privileges that exist. See FED. R.
EvID. 501; CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 950-954 (Deering 1986); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 4503
(McKinney 1992); Ky. R. EvID. 503; see also CAL. EvID. CODE § 980 (Deering 1986) (marital
privilege); id. § 994 (physician-patient privilege); id. § 1014 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (psychothera-
pist-patient privilege); id. §§ 1030-1034 (1986) (priest-penitent privilege); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L.
& R. 4502 (McKinney 1992) (marital privilege); id. 4504 (physician-patient privilege); id. 4505
(priest-penitent privilege); KY. R. EvID. 504 (marital privilege); id. 506 (counselor-client privi-
lege); id. 507 (psychotherapist-patient privilege). As previously mentioned, the attorney-client
privilege is a privilege designed to protect confidential communications between attorneys and
clients. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2,
§ 2017 at 133-34.
The attorney-client privilege has traditionally been viewed as a sacred and inviolable legal
doctrine. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383; Standard Chartered Bank PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings
(U.S.), Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that "[tihe attorney-client privilege is
the 'oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.'"
(quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389)); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2017. It is a domi-
nant feature of the discovery process and of the judicial system. See supra note 2; see also In re
Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that the attorney-client privilege "is of
ancient lineage and continuing importance"); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/
Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 49 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (commenting that the
attorney-client privilege has "ancient roots and modern necessity"), aff'd, 878 F.2d 801 (4th
Cir. 1989). The attorney-client privilege arose from a rich historical tradition and is central to
the effective representation by counsel. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2017 at 134 (stat-
ing that privileged communications are to be "zealously protected"); David A. Nelson, Com-
ment, Attorney-Client Privilege and Procedural Safeguards: Are They Worth the Costs?, 86 Nw.
U. L. REV. 368, 377 n.80 (remarking that the attorney-client privilege "promotes free and
open communications between attorney and client"); see also WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290
(stating that the attorney-client privilege is "the oldest of the privileges for confidential com-
munications"). Furthermore, the importance of the attorney-client privilege is bolstered by
Canon 4 of the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980).
The attorney-client privilege serves several purposes. Perhaps foremost is that it encourages
candor between clients and attorneys. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; In re Subpoenas Duces Te-
cum, 738 F.2d. 1367, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Baker's Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., No.
DV 87-0937, 1988 WL 138254, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1988) ("The attorney-client privilege
is based upon a policy of encouraging openness and full disclosure between a client and his or
Waiver
legal principles play a pivotal role in the formulation of a single, uniform test
her attorney." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
619 F. Supp. 1036, 1046 (D. Del. 1985); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 32
(D. Md. 1974); see also Nelson, supra, at n. 122.
The rationale supporting the objective of achieving increased candor between attorneys and
their clients is related to the corollary goal that this candor will ultimately result in "just"
determinations of controversies through the revelation of the "truth." See FED. R. Civ. P. 1;
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (stating that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege "is to en-
courage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration ofjustice.") (emphasis ad-
ded). See generally Nelson, supra, at 383 & 384 n. 124 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389). If a
client is aware that he or she can in confidence be candid with his or her attorney, this candor,
with the added insurance of confidentiality, should encourage clients to reveal all aspects of the
case, including "unfavorable" or "sensitive" facts. Id. at 383. In turn, the client's candor
enables the attorney to obtain all the facts that will assist in making important litigation deci-
sions such as the type of discovery plan that should be developed and implemented, refining
the case issues, refining and clarifying the trial strategy and considering the possibility of enter-
ing into a mutually-beneficial settlement. See id. at 383-84. In addition, a client's candor plays
a tremendous role in deriving the truth. Much of the information necessary for handling the
dispute comes from the client. Therefore, increased candor will assist in improving the truth-
finding function of the adjudication process. From this perspective the attorney-client privi-
lege aids the discovery of the "truth" of a particular matter rather than impeding the process.
The attorney-client privilege in its present manifestation is pro client, in that the client is
the holder of the privilege. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2321 (stating that "under the modern
theory, [the privilege] is plainly the client's, not the attorney's"); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 2, § 2017; see also Nelson, supra, at 385 (noting that "the privilege belongs to the client
and not the attorney" (footnote omitted)).
Arriving at this position constituted a significant alteration through the evolutionary pro-
cess. At this point, it is fruitful to examine briefly the historical development of the attorney-
client privilege. The attorney-client privilege has its roots in Roman Law. JOHN W. MCCOR-
MICK, EVIDENCE § 87, at 204 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984); Max Radin, Comment,
The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL. L. REV.
487, 488 (1928). Under the Roman configuration of the attorney-client privilege, the privilege
was held by the client. Id. at 487-88. While this stance is identical to the present manifesta-
tion of the privilege, the historical rationale is significantly different from the present scheme's
position. Under Roman law, the attorney was considered a slave of his master (or client); a
slave was essentially part of the master's family and the confidential relationship between fam-
fly members was grounded in mutual fidelity. Id. at 488. Consequently, the attorney was
deemed a "slave" of the client and only the client could hold and waive the privilege, as the
attorney had no real authority. Id This stance was significantly altered in the 1500s with the
advent of the Elizabethan era in England. Id. at 489; WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290; Geof-
frey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV.
1061, 1070-71 (1978); Nelson, supra, at 383; see also Union Carbide, 619 F. Supp. at 1046.
Instead of being viewed as a "slave" of the client, the attorney assumed the position of the
"master" of the situation, who like the "master" in the Roman times became the holder of the
attorney-client privilege. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290. Consequently, the attorney, and
not the client, as the holder of the privilege was the only individual permitted to exercise a
waiver of the privilege. Id. This view of the privilege was based upon a perception that attor-
neys were individuals of great honor. Id.; see also MCCORMICK, supra, § 92, at 221.
The erosion of this view of the attorney-client privilege started to occur around the 1700s.
WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290. Slowly, there was a shift from a focus on the attorney's
honor to the recognition that clients needed to be assured that, unless the client otherwise
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involving the waiver consequence of the inadvertent production of privileged
documents.
The goal of preserving the attorney-client privilege is evident in the lenient
test, as it forbids the waiver of the attorney-client privilege under any cir-
cumstance.8 5 On the other hand, the strict test endorses the liberal discov-
ery policy as it automaticlly waives the privilege and thus, allows for the
discovery of a greater amount of information. 86 It warrants noting that
Wigmore is frequently cited for endorsing the strict test because the lenient
test interferes with the truth-finding function.s7 Wigmore's commentaries,
however, contain statements suggesting that while he might prefer a stricter
test, he also might endorse a test more in line with the middle test. Such an
example is found in Wigmore's statement that "the law must prohibit such
disclosure except on the client's consent. Such is the modern theory.""8 The
policy concern inherent in this statement is closely aligned with the structure
of the middle test whereby the examination of the client's consent is con-
ducted under the auspices of whether or not the production was inadvertent.
In another section, however, Wigmore notes, without expressly endorsing
the view, that "all disclosures (oral or written) voluntarily made to the op-
posing party.., are receivable as being made under an implied waiver of
privilege." 9 This statement would be more in line with the standard used in
the strict test.90 It appears, therefore, that Wigmore can be used to support
several of the present approaches. While the two principles appear to con-
flict in this context, the alternative proposed in this Article attempts to har-
monize the two doctrines and to incorporate both of the policies.
requested, confidential communications would remain between the client and his or her attor-
ney. Hazard, supra, at 1066-67; see also WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290. However, it was not
until the late-i 800s that the alteration in the perspective and application of the attorney-client
privilege was completed. See id.
The final resting point of the evolution of the attorney-client privilege is as it operates today.
As previously explained, the client holds the privilege and therefore, is the only one permitted
to waive the privilege. See supra notes 21-24; see also WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2321 (noting
that under the modern theory only the client can waive the attorney-client privilege).
85. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text (describing the lenient test and its impli-
cations for the attorney-client privilege).
86. See supra notes 21-24 (discussing the strict test).
87. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291.
88. 8 id. § 2291, at 545 (emphasis added).
89. 8 id. § 2325, at 633.
90. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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II. THE PROPOSED APPROACH: THE "ALTERNATIVE TEST"
A. Formulating the Alternative Test
1. Components of the Test
The following test should be applied by all courts as the means of resolv-
ing the waiver consequence issue: Once the parties are aware91 that privi-
leged documents have been inadvertently produced, a rebuttable
presumption is created whereby it is deemed that the producing party's inad-
vertent production has not waived the attorney-client privilege. This pre-
sumption is indicative of the alternative test's endorsement of attempting to
secure the attorney-client privilege. Subsequently, the producing party
should then request the return of the documents. Under this test, two key
factors are initially presumed in the producing party's favor: 1) that the priv-
ileged documents were inadvertently produced; and 2) that the attorney-cli-
ent privilege remains unscathed by the production of the documents.
However, the producing party has the initial burden of proving that the doc-
uments are privileged. 92 This burden is identical to that in the three cur-
rently existing tests.93
Once it is shown that the documents are protected by the attorney-client
privilege, it is automatically presumed that the producing party did not
waive the privilege and that the production was inadvertent. If the non-
producing party does not contest this scenario, then the non-producing party
must return the documents and is prohibited from using or relying upon
them in any manner during the course of the litigation.94
91. The required awareness, or notice, of the production of privileged documents could
require that the producing party notify the non-producing party or vice-versa. See Kansas
City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 172 (D.
Kan. 1989) (producing party notified non-producing party when it discovered it had inadver-
tently produced privileged documents); see also Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prods., Inc., 672 F.
Supp. 237, 242-43 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (same); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp.
951, 952 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (same). In addition the idea of requiring the non-producing party to
return the privileged document to the producing party was recently addressed in an ethical
opinion issued by the American Bar Association. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992) (reprinted in LAWS MAN. OF PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/
BNA) 1001:155.
92. See supra notes 2, 27.
93. Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 207
(N.D. Ind. 1990) (stating that "[t]he burden is on the party asserting the attorney-client privi-
lege to establish its existence"); Parkway Gallery Furniture, 116 F.R.D. at 50 (holding that
"It]he proponent of the attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving its applicability"
(citation omitted)); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 20
(D. Neb. 1985) (stating that "[t]he burden is upon the party claiming a privilege to demon-
strate that it applies in the particular circumstances of the case"); see also WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 2, § 2016 (burden of proof is on the person attempting to show the existence of the
attorney-client privilege); infra part III.
94. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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However, if the non-producing party contests the producing party's as-
sessment of the situation, then the non-producing party has the right to at-
tempt to rebut the nonwaiver presumption." The non-producing party
might first opt to refute the producing party's contention that the documents
are privileged. If this fails, the non-producing party must then overcome the
rebuttable presumption. Thus, the non-producing party, in order to rebut
the presumption and successfully establish that a waiver of the privilege has
occurred, must prove two factors: 1) the privileged documents were not in-
advertently produced; and 2) as a result, the attorney-client privilege is
waived.
In order to prove the necessary elements, the non-producing party can
gather information96 establishing that the management of the production fell
below the level of care required for ensuring the exclusion of privileged
materials. To rebut the non-waiver presumption, the non-producing party
must examine and present proof on the following factors:
1. the reasonableness of the precautions to prevent inadvertent
disclosure;
2. the scope of discovery;
3. the extent of disclosure; and
4. the overriding issue of fairness.
Several of these factors are identical to those examined in the middle test.
97
The middle test, however, also includes an additional factor, the "time fac-
tor," that considers the length of time that has passed before the producing
party became aware of the inadvertently produced privileged document(s).
In other words, the middle test takes into account the length of time that the
document has been in the possession of the non-producing party. 98 This
"time factor" is the only middle test element excluded from determining
whether the non-producing party has rebutted the nonwaiver presumption.
Several considerations led to the decision to exclude the time factor from
the alternative test. First, the Federal Rules of Evidence allow for the exclu-
sion of evidence when the prejudicial value exceeds the probative value.99
95. See Standard Chartered Bank PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings (U.S.), Inc., 111 F.R.D.
76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that "the burden is particularly heavy on one seeking to pierce
the attorney-client privilege" (citation omitted)).
96. The non-producing party may make discovery requests to obtain information regard-
ing how the producing party managed and conducted the document production during which
the privileged documents were produced. The non-producing party can also obtain discovery
pertaining to the alleged privileged nature of the documents if this remains a point of conten-
tion between the parties. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
97. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
98. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 117 F.R.D. 119, 121 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (not-
ing that "delay in claiming the privilege can result in waiver" (emphasis added)).
99. FED. R. EvID. 403.
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Objections based upon this provision occur during trial, after the parties
have had pre-trial access to and notice of all information and evidence. Sub-
stantively, this is no different from a party having pre-trial access to an inad-
vertently-produced privileged document which the court orders returned to
the producing party and of which the court prohibits any use of during the
remainder of the trial."° Therefore, this analogy supports any importance
attached to the time factor and adds support for its elimination from the
alternative test. Thus, in rebutting the presumption it is immaterial whether
an attorney possessed a document for five days instead of five months.
The use of motions in limine 1o is another basis supporting the exclusion
of the time factor. Motions in limine are typically filed immediately before
trial in order to request the exclusion of particular evidence from trial. Typi-
cally, both sides have been aware for quite some time of the existence and
contents of the information that is the subject of the motion in limine.102 If
the motion in limine is granted, then the length of time that a party possesses
a document becomes irrelevant since the party is precluded from using that
information at trial.
10 3
100. See Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla.
1991) (stating that "a court can repair much of the damage done by disclosure by preventing
or restricting the use of the document at trial" (citation omitted)), aff'd in part, question certi-
fied, 991 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1993).
101. Some states define motions in limine as motions filed by either party "in advance of a
trial [regarding] the admission or exclusion of evidence." E.g., KY. R. EVID. R. 103(d).
Courts view motions in limine as making "a definitive ruling on the admissibility of evidence at
the outset of the trial.' " Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 1989)
(quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5037, at 194 (1977)). Others consider the motion as "a necessary adjunct to the
inherent power of a trial court to exclude inadmissible and prejudicial evidence before and
during trial. The granting of such motions may necessitate the issuance of protective orders
which will assure a fair and impartial administration of justice." Burrus v. Silhavy, 293
N.E.2d 794, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973).
102. In a recent Michigan case, for example, the defendant had solicited legal advice from
another inmate known throughout the prison as "counselor." United States v. Tyler, 745 F.
Supp. 423, 424 (W.D. Mich. 1990). Counselor had a fascimile of a law school diploma on the
wall of his cell and routinely gave legal advice to the inmates. Id. The defendant filed a
motion in limine to exclude his communication with Counselor, claiming that they were pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. The court found they were so protected and
granted defendant's motion. Id. at 425-26. The court gave no consideration to the fact that
prosecutors had had access to the documents for some time and planned to use them in the
upcoming case. Id. at 423. Contra Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc., 131 F.R.D 179, 183
(N.D. Cal. 1990) (noting that where it took the plaintiffs six weeks to realize that they had
inadvertently produced privileged documents, "[b]y that time, the letter had been thoroughly
analyzed by defendants' attorney, and the client had been informed of its contents"); Baxter
Travenol, 117 F.R.D. at 121 ("Where prior to the assertion of the privilege, the documents
have been examined and used by the opposing party, it may be unfair and unrealistic to uphold
the privilege." (citation omitted)).
103. In addition, several courts opt for other means of handling the inadvertent production
of documents when the privilege is not waived. See, e.g., Georgetown Manor, 753 F. Supp. at
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Furthermore, if a court orders the return of the privileged documents to
the producing party, then the non-producing party has, in all likelihood,
already viewed the document and is aware of its contents, which is the focus
of the time factor's concern. Thus, even though the non-producing party has
had access to the documents, might have read them, and may be familiar
with their contents, the court can still issue an order prohibiting the use of
the documents and their contents at trial.l°4
Lastly, the length of time that the privileged document has been in the
domain of the opposing party has no relation to the goal of improving lawy-
ering skills or of furthering the policing function found in strict and middle
waiver tests.' 05 If the non-waiver presumption can be rebutted, it is because
of an inadequacy in the manner in which the attorney produced the docu-
ment(s) in the first place and not for how long the document(s) remained in
the non-producing party's possession.
Under the alternative test, once the non-producing party feels secure
1 0 6
that it can rebut the nonwaiver presumption, it can approach the producing
party to confer 0 7 about the issue. If the producing party continues to ad-
here to its inadvertency and non-waiver position, then the non-producing
party can move to retain the documents and, if possible, to compel the pro-
938 (noting that if non-waiver is the consequence then the "court can repair much of the
damage done by disclosure by preventing or restricting use of the document at trial" (emphasis
added) (citation omitted)); Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Bass, No. CIV.A. 88-5257, 1989 WL 9354
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 1989) (finding that the privilege had not been waived and ordering the de-
fendant to return the inadvertently produced documents to the plaintiff). Additionally, the
producing party can be ordered "not [to] be directed to respond to the line of questioning
about the document." Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D.
12, 21 (D. Neb. 1985). Similarly, a Florida district court held that, given that the attorney-
client privilege remained intact, the appropriate remedy was to render the inadvertently-pro-
duced documents inadmissible. United States v. Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc., 742 F. Supp.
641, 645 (S.D. Fla. 1990); see also Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburg & Midway
Coal Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D. Kan. 1989) (ordering the non-producing party to
return privileged documents to the producing party); Baker's Aid v. Hussman Foodservice
Co., No. CV 87-0937, 1988 WL 138254, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1983) (ordering privileged
documents returned to producing party, and forbidding the non-producing party from
"mak[ing] .. .use of th[e] document or its contents during the course of th[e] litigation").
104. See Georgetown Manor, 753 F. Supp. at 938; supra note 100.
105. See infra part II.B.1 (discussing the benefits of the alternative test).
106. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
107. The local rules of many federal courts have mandatory "meet and confer" rules re-
quiring the parties to discuss the discovery dispute before any motions related to the dispute
can be filed. See generally Pepper's Steel & Alloys, 742 F. Supp. at 645 (noting that the inad-
vertent disclosure of privileged documents should be resolved between the parties, thus avoid-
ing substantial court involvement).
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duction of additional privileged documents.108 The producing party can op-
pose this motion and/or bring a motion seeking the return of the documents.
Once judicial involvement is requested, the court must determine whether
the presumption has been successfully rebutted. If the court holds that the
non-producing party has failed to rebut the presumption, several options are
then available to the producing party. The producing party can request that
the non-producing party return the privileged documents.' °9 The court may
also order the non-producing party to refrain from questioning witnesses
about the contents or the subject of the privileged matter. 10 Furthermore,
the court may preclude the non-producing party from introducing the privi-
leged documents into evidence and prevent all subsequent use of the
documents. 1 '
2. Balancing Policy and Privilege
The alternative test reinforces the sanctity of the attorney-client privi-
lege-the importance of ensuring candor between attorney and client.
1 2
However, it is important that the alternative approach acknowledge and in-
corporate some of the critical concerns embodied in the strict and middle
tests. '13
Candor, or the attorney-client privilege, and truth-finding, or discovery,
have generally been viewed as being at loggerheads, evidenced by the exist-
ence of three tests representing diverse endorsements of different legal princi-
ples. "4 Nonetheless, they are inextricably linked, just as candor on the part
108. One of the most prevalent dangers of waiver being deemed the consequence of inad-
vertent production of privileged documents is that it opens the door to access to other privi-
leged documents. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; supra note 8.
109. Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp 936, 939 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(ordering privileged communications to be returned to producing party), aff'd in part, question
certified, 991 F.2d 1533 (1lth Cir. 1993); Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Bass, No. CIV.A. 88-5257,
1989 WL 9354, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 1989) (same).
110. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D. Neb.
1985); see also Note, Inadvertent Disclosure, supra note 1, at 609 n.45 (noting that "[flew
courts discuss what procedure to use in permitting assertion of the privilege despite inadver-
tent disclosure").
111. Georgetown Manor, 753 F. Supp. at 939; Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone Star Indus.,
132 F.R.D. 558, 559 (D. Kan. 1990), sum. judgment granted, No. 88-2431-V, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18669 (D. Kan. Dec. 19, 1991), aff'd, 982 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1992); Note, Inadver-
tent Disclosure, supra note 1, at 608 & n.44; supra note 103. See generally FED. R. EVID. 403.
112. See supra note 84; supra note 2 and accompanying text. Another commentator advo-
cating the creation of a new test also opted to develop an alternative test that places greater
importance on preserving the attorney-client privilege. Note, Inadvertent Disclosure, supra
note 1, at 623-24 (noting that "[a]ny alternative approach should focus on the intent of the
client to preserve the confidentiality of communications subject to the privilege").
113. See infra notes 121, 123, 153-76 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
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of the client, achieved through the preservation of the attorney-client privi-
lege, and truth-finding in the judicial process achieved through the discovery
system, are intertwined. It is difficult to "discover" the truth if the client
does not feel free to be "candid." The new test's rebuttable presumption
furthers the principles of the attorney-client privilege and the liberal discov-
ery system by ensuring that the truth-finding objectives, as necessarily modi-
fied by privileged communications, are carried out.' 
15
The alternative test also incorporates and addresses the strict test's em-
phasis on both "negligent" or sloppy lawyering and encouraging good lawy-
ering skills.' 16 Attorneys whose document production activities fall below
an acceptable level will be singled out and penalized by the non-producing
attorney's ability to successfully rebut the presumption. This acts as a "po-
licing function" for an attorney's actions. Thus, the test reconciles the con-
flicts that exist between the attorney-client privilege and the discovery
policy.
B. Critiquing the Alternative Test
1. Strengths
A key strength of the alternative test is that it is fairly simple to adminis-
ter. The simple process of the test," 7 with its use of the rebuttable presump-
tion, should create a situation in which the parties must initially attempt to
resolve. In addition, the parties will simultaneously be made aware of the
increased certainty in how the test will be applied and the likelihood of the
outcome given a particular set of facts. Furthermore, the alternative test's
predetermined consequence of non-waiver is designed to reduce the undesir-
able amount of uncertainty that presently exists when the middle test is ap-
plied, while retaining the middle test's advantageous flexibility.
The alternative test discards the inflexible positions taken by the lenient
and strict tests"' by including a rebuttable presumption that enables courts
to entertain cases that might require equitable considerations, or where there
is a need to penalize1 19 attorneys for below-standard lawyering habits. If the
115. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text (discussing the various benefits of the
alternative test, including the promotion of good lawyering skills); infra note 152.
117. See supra notes 91-111 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 15-24; infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text; see also Appendices,
Chart B.
119. See Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 558, 560 (D. Kan.
1990) (stating that "[flairness in this case constrains a holding that the client should not suffer
because of the actions of counsel"), sum. judgment granted, No. 88-2431-V, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18669 (D. Kan. Dec. 19, 1991), aff'd, 982 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1992). The possible
penalty is that the non-producing party can retain the documents, and although this "penalty"
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non-producing party contends 2 ° that the presumption is inequitable or un-
fair, then the non-producing party has an opportunity to have the situation
reviewed, similar to the process available under the middle test.1 2 ' Thus, the
alternative test's inclusion of the rebuttable presumption reduces the poten-
tial for unfair outcomes. 22
The alternative test assists in accomplishing the "truth-finding" goal that
is central to the strict test.123 It encourages client candor, which ultimately
helps in discovering the "truth" and leads to the rendering of a just determi-
nation, comporting with the interests of justice for all parties involved. The
test also seeks to reduce judicial intervention in resolving the matter, a re-
duction that will result in a positive impact on the litigation process.' 24 The
subsequent reduction in litigation is primarily derived from the reduced un-
certainty created by the adoption of the alternative test, and the test's use of
the rebuttable presumption. Because a party deciding to rebut the presump-
tion must have sufficient evidence, the issue must be investigated and the
cost of pursuing judicial relief and expending resources must be weighed
against the benefits, 125 given the existence of the non-favorable rebuttable
presumption. In other words, a reduction in litigation will result from the
non-producing party's determination of whether it is cost efficient to try to
rebut the presumption which will, in turn, reduce the expenditure of both
judicial and personal resources.
A final benefit of the alternative test is that it encourages good lawyering
skills. The test's "built in" penalty-that the opponent may succeed in re-
butting the presumption and attaining the release of privileged documents-
functions as an incentive for attorneys not to stray far from conducting their
legal duties in an appropriate manner. In order to avoid this "penalty," at-
torneys will be forced to be more conscientious during document
production.
is meted out for the attorney's actions, the client is the actual recipient of the repercussions
from the penalty. In other words, it is the client who is penalized. See infra note 152.
120. The non-producing party's actions to attempt to rebut the presumption are, of course,
subject to the mandates of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11. FED. R. Civ. P 11;
see infra note 139.
121. See infra notes 157-70 and accompanying text.
122. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (providing that the goal of the adjudicatory process is
to have "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of every action).
123. See infra notes 121, 152.
124. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (mandating that speedy and efficient adjudications are to be
obtained in "every action").
125. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-17 (3d ed. 1986)
(applying cost-benefit analysis to legal decisionmaking).
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2. Weaknesses
The alternative test is a marked improvement over the strict, lenient, and
middle tests.' 26 However, a possible shortcoming of the alternative ap-
proach is that, because of the rebuttable presumption, there may be a risk
that the overall success of the truth-finding aspect of discovery will be com-
prised, particularly when compared with the emphasis given to this concern
under the strict test. 127 Therefore, critics might claim that one weakness of
the alternative test, like the lenient test, is that it impedes the truth-finding
function. However, given the alternative test's position of promoting the
attorney-client privilege as the legal doctrine to be protected, this perceived
shortcoming may more aptly be deemed a consequence of the institution of
the alternative test, rather than a weakness.
This perceived weakness is also present in several evidentiary rules.
Courts adhering to the strict test seem to make an inviolable connection
between the truth-finding function and the "absence" of any remedy. In
International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp. ,28 the United States
District Court for the District of Massachussetts held that a waiver oc-
curred, took a strong stance, and stated that "[tjhere is no order which can
remedy what has occurred [the inadvertent production of privileged docu-
ments]."' 129 A similar position was taken in Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc. v.
Abbott Lab.,13° where the United States District Court for the Norhtern Dis-
trict of Illinois noted that "[when] the documents have been examined and
used by the opposing party, it may be unfair and unrealistic to uphold the
privilege."'' Such tough positions' 3 2 forget or omit an important aspect of
the interaction between the truth-finding and remedial 33 functions of the
judicial system, as there are numerous instances where relevant evidence,
which would enhance the "truth-finding" function, is excluded.' In the
context of the inadvertent production of privileged documents, for example,
one court noted that the fact that a document had been inadvertently pro-
126. See infra notes 164-76 and accompanying text.
127. The truth-finding function of the judicial process is frequently cited by strict test ad-
herents as a reason for the test's duration in this area. See supra notes 123-24 and accompany-
ing text; infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
128. 120 F.R.D. 445 (D. Mass. 1988).
129. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
130. 117 F.R.D. 119 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
131. Id. at 121.
132. See also In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C.
Cir.) (stating that "it would be unfair and unrealistic now to permit the privilege's assertion as
to these documents which have been thoroughly examined and used by the Government for
several years" (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 415 (1979).
133. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text; supra note 103.
134. See, e.g., supra notes 99, 103.
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duced and the opponent may have seen it does not preclude "a court [from]
repair[ing] much of the damage done by disclosure by preventing or restrict-
ing use of the document at trial."'1 35  In a similar vein, other courts have
specifically noted that the non-waiver of the attorney-client privilege can be
enforced by ordering that "such documents shall not be used by defendant at
trial except upon further order of the court."'136 Another court resolved the
issue by prohibiting deposition responses to "the line of questioning about
the document, or about the meeting."' 37 Thus, much of the criticism based
upon the alleged hinderance of the truth-finding function that would result
by instituting a less absolutist and automatic exclusionary rule can be dis-
missed by examining how courts regularly follow what is common trial prac-
tice-excluding evidence that is inadmissible for one reason or another.
Thus, any perceived impediment to the truth-finding process that the alter-
native test may possess is weakened.
Another possible disadvantage to the alternative test is that it may not
fully achieve its goal of reducing litigation through the institution of a uni-
form test. 38 This possible consequence manifests itself in two ways. First, if
the non-producing party has conducted discovery and, in accordance with
Rule 1 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 attempts to rebut the
135. Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(footnote omitted), aff'd in part, question certified, 991 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1993).
136. Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone Star Indus., 132 F.R.D. 558, 560 (D. Kan. 1990) (em-
phasis added), sum. judgment granted, No. 88-243 I-V, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18669 (D. Kan.
Dec. 19, 1991), aff'd, 982 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1992).
137. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D. Neb.
1985).
138. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
139. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name,
whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's address. Ex-
cept when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an
attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken
unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader
or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule,
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include
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presumption, the case load of the courts could be increased. Additionally,
some amount of discovery" will need to be conducted by the non-produc-
ing party to assess the likelihood of successfully rebutting the presumption.
However, in litigation, the possibility always exists that a discovery battle
may ensue and that judicial action will be required to resolve such battles.
Finally, while a critical objective of the alternative test is to improve cer-
tainty for litigants confronted with this situation, the test, because it does not
endorse an absolutist view, certainly will not achieve the same degree of cer-
tainty that is inherent in the strict and lenient tests.141 This should not be
viewed, however, as an obstacle sufficient to disregard the potential benefits
from the adoption and implementation of the alternative test. Part of the
alternative test's uncertainty stems from the fact that, while attempting to
reduce or minimize uncertainty, the test has incorporated numerous features
and accommodated various doctrinal conflicts to prevent inequitable results
and to promulgate the continuance of the two legal principles in conflict.' 42
III. THE ALTERNATIVE TEST COMPARED TO THE THREE
EXISTING TESTS
A. Versus the Lenient Test
Both the lenient and the alternative tests focus on inadvertence. The alter-
native test, 143 however, has additional similarities and dissimilarities to the
lenient test that warrant discussion. The most dominant feature shared by
both tests is an endorsement of the attorney-client privilege as the primary
legal doctrine to be protected. As mentioned above, the lenient test's en-
dorsement is contained in its statement of the test: Waiver of the attorney-
client privileged document cannot occur absent the party's intent to waive.
The alternative test contains the same general principle, but approaches it
from a slightly different stance. The alternative test automatically presumes
that the attorney-client privilege continues to protect an inadvertently pro-
duced privileged document, even after disclosure. Thus, the privilege is not
waived, thereby placing the burden for proving otherwise on the non-pro-
an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
140. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (governing discovery).
141. See supra notes 85-140 and accompanying text; infra notes 142-56 and accompanying
text.
142. See supra notes 83-105, 112-25, 134-40 and accompanying text; infra notes 143-70
and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 85-105 and accompanying text.
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ducing party.'" Both tests also place the burden of proving the existence of
the attorney-client privilege on the producing party.' 45
The manner in which the lenient test operates technically lends itself to
greater certainty in the outcome of privilege disputes. If the protected docu-
ment is inadvertently produced, then the document is automatically re-
turned to the producing party. 146 Any disparity in the certainty of the
outcome presented by the two tests, however, is tempered by the alternative
test's rebuttable presumption, as the presumption creates an environment
that lends a heightened degree of certainty to the outcome-non-waiver-
and places the burden of proving intent to the contrary on the non-produc-
ing party. 147
Several differences also exist between the two tests. The most obvious dif-
ference is that the lenient test lacks the alternative test's flexibility, as it pre-
cludes examination of specific unique circumstances that might arise to
permit waiver of the privilege, particularly in document intensive' 48 and
cumbersome litigation. On the other hand, the new test's rebuttable pre-
sumption allows for this type of inquiry and, if necessary, permits detouring
from the lenient test's position. Additionally, the alternative test, unlike the
lenient test, is not as absolute.' 4 9 The lenient test's absolutist manner can be
viewed from a perspective similar to the ideology and principles of strict tort
liability. 150
Another significant difference is that, although the alternative test does
not advocate or encourage shoddy work product or a disregard for profes-
144. See supra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
148. See Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 937 (S.D. Fla.
1991) (noting that counsel and a paralegal "prepared thousands of pages of documents for
inspection"), aff'd in part, question certified, 991 F.2d 1533 (1 1th Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Marine
Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 483 (E.D. Va. 1991) (finding the number of
documents inspected to be between 15,000 and 50,000); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech, Inc.,
131 F.R.D. 179, 181 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (estimating the number of documents reviewed by coun-
sel "in preparation for defendants' inspection" at approximately 6000); Baker's Aid v. Huss-
mann Foodservice Co., No. CV87-0937, 1988 WL 138254 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1988) (noting
that the attorney examined more than 5,000 documents); see also Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 208 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (describing document
discovery as "extensive"); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D.
103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that 16,000 pages were inspected in response to the docu-
ment request); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (re-
sponding to a document request "encompassing all Mendenhall files"); supra note 3
(discussing the risk associated with document intensive cases).
149. See Appendices, Chart B.
150. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 75, at 534-38 (5th ed.
1984) (discussing the elements and nature of strict liability); Appendices, Chart B.
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sional duties and obligations, the lenient test's absolutist stance precludes all
inquiry into such behavior and thus precludes its ability to function as a
policing element. In contrast, the alternative test assumes that an attorney
has been performing his or her professional duties in an appropriate manner,
and allows for the rebuttable presumption to be continually waved as a "car-
rot" in front of attorneys as a policing function, which acts as an incentive
for attorneys to execute their duties in accordance with high professional
standards.' 5 ' Since unfortunately this is not always the case, the alternative
test, like the lenient test, functions to minimize the client's suffering for the
attorney's foibles.' 52
This sought-after heightened degree of certainty also introduces another
attribute of the alternative test that is absent from the lenient test. The alter-
native test's rebuttable presumption may deter litigants from immediately
resorting to tribunals for the resolution of waiver issues. A positive conse-
quence of this is that there could be a reduction in judicial and personal
resource expenditures.
In conclusion, the lenient test and the alternative test share common
ground in some areas and differ in others. However, both maintain a mutual
respect for and an endorsement of the sanctity of the attorney-client
privilege.
B. Versus the Strict Test
The alternative test and the strict test diverge on one important and criti-
cal point-waiver. Under the alternative test, waiver is not presumed,
1 53
while under the strict test, waiver of the protection is an automatic conse-
quence. However, both tests require an initial review to determine whether
the documents are actually privileged.' 54 In addition, both tests place the
burden of proving the existence of privilege upon the producing party.' 55
151. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Appendices, Chart B; supra note 105. See generally MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1992) (outlining an attorney's duties).
152. This should be compared with the situation under the application of the strict test.
Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del.); sum. judgment granted in
part, dismissed in part, 742 F. Supp 860 (D. Del. 1990), superseded by statute as stated in
Young v. West Coast Indus. Relations Ass'n, 144 F.R.D. 206 (D. Del. 1992); Monarch Ce-
ment Co. v. Lone Star Indus., 132 F.R.D. 558, 560 (D. Kan. 1990) (providing that "the client
should not suffer because of the actions of counsel"), sum. judgment granted, No. 88-243 I-V,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18669 (D. Kan. Dec. 19, 1991), aff'd, 982 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1992);
Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 (stating that "if we are serious about the attorney-client
privilege and its relation to the client's welfare, we should require more than such negligence
by counsel before the client can be deemed to have given up the privilege" (citation omitted)
(emphasis in original)); see also infra note 153 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 24, 92 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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Both tests find that it is unnecessary to inquire whether the production
was inadvertent or not. Under the strict test, this inquiry is entirely irrele-
vant,' 56 and coincides with the mechanics of the strict test where the only
question posed is whether the produced document is protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege. The alternative test, however, approaches this feature
differently, assuming that there is no need to make such an inquiry because
of the automatic rebuttable presumption. Although the two tests superfi-
cially appear to operate similarly, the alternative test's approach is entirely
different from that of the strict test. The alternative test automatically en-
dorses the attorney-client privilege, while the strict test's position reflects an
overriding concern with the truth-finding function and the discovery policy.
The alternative test eventually does allow, however, for an inquiry into the
circumstances of the production through the use of the rebuttable
presumption. 157
Both tests seek to maintain a high degree of professional excellence in the
legal profession. 5 ' The strict test accomplishes this task by imposing an
automatic penalty-waiver-upon every attorney who allows a document
protected by the attorney-client privilege to come into an opponent's posses-
sion. This mode of operation does have its virtues, as it sends a strong signal
to attorneys that the best is required and expected from them. The alterna-
tive test also addresses this concern by starting with the assumption that the
attorney's actions were in accordance with professional expectations. The
existence of the rebuttable presumption, however, provides the opponent
with the opportunity, if warranted, to establish that the producing party's
attorney's actions fell below an acceptable standard. Thus, the alternative
and strict tests each provide an incentive for encouraging excellent and con-
scientious lawyering skills. Yet there exists an important difference in how
these two tests attempt to accomplish this goal. The alternative test does not
impose a blanket penalty upon all lawyers whose opponents have their privi-
leged documents in their possession. Under the strict test, the client ulti-
mately pays for the foibles of the attorney.' 59 The alternative test, however,
156. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 116-42 and accompanying text.
159. The strict test's placement of the penalty on the client seems to be partially based on
the belief that the client has an option-to seek recourse against the attorney. Where the strict
test is applied, case law suggests that this should be the manner in which inadvertent produc-
tion problems are handled. In In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989), where after
applying the strict test and thereby allowing the non-producing party to retain the privileged
documents, the court noted that the actions of the producing party's attorney were tantamount
to negligence. Id. at 980. The court declared:
Even assuming Company's disclosure was due to "bureaucratic error", which we
take to be a euphemism that necessarily implies human error, that unfortunate lapse
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simply reveals that someone in the company and thereby Company itself ... was
careless with the confidentiality of its privileged communications.
IM This same approach is suggested in In re Standard Fin. Management Corp., 77 B.R. 324
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) where the court, again applying the strict test, noted that inadvertent
disclosure is "after all, merely a euphemism for negligence and, certainly... one is expected to
pay a price for one's negligent actions." Id. at 330.
The elements of a legal malpractice action mirror those in a negligence action:
Under New York law [and that of most other states], the elements of a claim for
legal malpractice are (1) existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) negligence
on the part of the attorney; (3) proximate cause; and (4) proof that, but for the al-
leged acts of malpractice, plaintiff would have been able to recover or proceed in a
manner other than that which actually occurred.
Sacco v. Burke, 764 F. Supp. 918, 920-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citations omitted). The existence
of the attorney-client relationship gives rise to a duty and negligence on the part of the attor-
ney is a breach of that duty. The third and fourth elements require the traditional forms of
causation in a negligence action, while the fourth, in addition, implies that an actual injury
must have occurred.
While this action is available for the producing party but not for the non-producing party, it
appears that this theoretical alternative for redress has several critical flaws. One flaw is that if
such an action is brought, then the attorney-client privilege is completely waived. This further
undermines the goals of the attorney-client privilege that have already been attacked under the
application of the strict test. The difficulties in bringing such an action present the second flaw
of this theoretical alternative. When the alleged act of negligence consists of the inadvertent
production of privileged documents, the client or claimant is likely to have difficulty establish-
ing three of the malpractice elements. Primarily, it will be difficult for the client to show that
the attorney breached the duty to use reasonable care, which has been summarized as follows:
His duty to his client requires an attorney to exercise the knowledge, skill, and
ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession simi-
larly situated. He is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reason-
able degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of the business he
undertakes to do. Within this standard, he will be protected so long as he acts hon-
estly and in good faith.
7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 199 (1993) (footnotes omitted). Under such a definition, an
attorney/defendant may be able to convince a jury that the duty was not breached despite the
production of privileged documents. If the original case involved thousands of documents, and
the attorney established an elaborate method of review before production, a jury would proba-
bly find that reasonable care had been used. To ask for more would be seen as improper,
requiring the attorney to "exercise extraordinary diligence." Id.
Secondly, even if a breach of duty can be shown, the client must shoulder an extremely large
burden to establish "but for" causation. Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So. 2d 626 (Miss. 1987),
exemplifies the degree of the problem. In Hickox, the attorney/defendant was retained to
bring an action for medical malpractice and failed to file the papers within the time frame
required by the statute of limitations. Id. at 629-30. The court found this to be negligence, or
failure to use reasonable care, as a matter of law, id. at 634, stating:
[Tihe plaintiff must show that but for their attorney's negligence, they would have
been successful in the prosecution or defense of the underlying action....
.. [T]he plaintiff/client carries this burden by trying the underlying medical mal-
practice claim as a part of this legal malpractice case . .
Id. (citations omitted).
The burden of this showing would be greater where the alleged negligent act is the produc-
tion of privileged materials. The client will essentially have to re-litigate the underlying action
as though production had never taken place, and then prove that the outcome would have been
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more favorable to him or her. Unless the inadvertently produced document was a true "smok-
ing gun," which proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a more favorable settlement
or different verdict would have occurred without the inadvertent production, such a determi-
nation would likely require intricate twists of logic.
Third, proximate cause would be difficult to establish. Many factors influence a jury's ver-
dict or encourage the parties to reach a settlement, thus the attorney/defendant could argue
that any number of these factors caused the client's loss. The opponent's investigation, the
skill of the opponent's attorney, or the client's own failures on the witness stand could be cited
as more direct causes of the client's disappointment than the privilege waiver.
Aside from the difficulty inherent establishing the requisite elements, a third flaw of the
theoretical alternative is that the client/claimant will find himself before the jury in an unenvi-
able position, essentially saying, "I was trying to keep this information secret but my attorney
erred, the court forced me to reveal my secrets, and I lost." While such "sneakiness" is per-
missible in the American court system, it will be unattractive to the jury. The jury may find in
favor of the attorney/defendant on the rationale that the client/claimant was culpable for not
voluntarily disclosing the information in the first place.
Therefore, the strict test's implied avenue of legal malpractice is more attractive theoreti-
cally than realistically. Case law does not indicate that malpractice actions are appropriate for
the inadvertent production of privileged documents. Thus, courts apply the strict test in part
because of a theoretical option which in reality is not a viable option. This point is illustrated
in Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). While Coleman concerned capital punish-
ment appeals, it illustrates the illusory "option" often relied upon in creating and applying
legal tests. In Coleman, the petitioner's attorneys failed to file an appeal with the Virginia
Supreme Court from the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeus corpus within the thirty
day period proscribed by statute. Id. at 2553.. When Coleman tried to bring his writ in federal
court to argue the same issues on which he was denied a hearing by the Virginia court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to hear him, holding that the
issues had been resolved in the Virginia court on "independent and adequate state grounds,"
namely the procedural default rules. Id.
In considering the appeal of this refusal, the Supreme Court reiterated several case rules in a
single statement:
In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court
pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review
of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and
actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that
failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Id. at 2565. Anticipating this ruling, Coleman argued that his attorneys' negligence caused his
default. Id. at 2566.
The Supreme Court did not respond favorably to this position, stating that "[a]ttorney igno-
rance or inadvertence is not 'cause' because the attorney is the petitioner's agent when acting,
or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must 'bear the risk of
attorney error.'" Id. at 2566 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). This
rule, however, applies only when the default occurs in a discretionary appellate hearing. In a
criminal trial or appeal as of right, the Sixth Amendment precludes actions that force the
accused to bear the risk of attorney negligence.
In contrast, since Coleman's writ of habeus corpus was a discretionary appeal, Coleman was
forced to bear the burden of his attorney's negligence. As a result of this and his failure to
show that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" would occur, Coleman literally died under
the weight of this burden. See Robert L. Jackson & David G. Savage, Final Appeals Rejected,
Killer is Executed, L.A. TiMEs, May 21, 1992 at A16.
Civil litigants are forced to bear a similar burden when the courts apply the strict test to
inadvertent document production. Such litigants lose the potential benefit that may have re-
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prevents this from happening by providing other forms of recourse."W
The alternative test's presumption also reduces the undesirable absolutism
of the strict test. This absolutism is similar to the tort law concept of strict
liability.' 61 This presents another important difference between the tests
from a client's perspective. By the alternative test moving along the contin-
uum away from the strict test's absolutist stance it reduces the likelihood of
a non-producing party being the recipient of a "windfall." This result com-
ports with the general goals and objectives pronounced in Rule 1 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. 
162
C. Versus the Middle Test
The middle test was developed primarily in response to the inflexibility,
limited breadth and extreme consequences that result from the application of
the lenient and strict tests.16' The middle test also acknowledges and at-
tempts to reconcile the doctrinal battle that exists between the attorney-cli-
ent privilege (under the lenient test) and a liberal discovery policy (under the
strict test). 6' Similarly, the alternative test acknowledges the conflict be-
suited from non-disclosure of these documents, as well as others that the waiver may require to
be produced. These losses are incurred as a result of the carelessness of another. Ordinarily,
when an individual is injured, a cause of action in negligence accrues. In comparison, courts
applying the strict test seem to imply that a legal malpractice action is an appropriate remedy
for the client's injuries. This provides an impractical remedy for clients whose attorneys inad-
vertently waive the attorney-client privilege.
The impracticality for the privilege holder to seek redress is implicit in the lenient test.
Cases applying the lenient test recognize that negligence on the part of the attorney may exist
when privileged documents are inadvertently produced. See Helman v. Murray Steaks, Inc.,
728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del.), sum. judgment granted in part, dismissed in part, 742 F.
Supp. 860 (D. Del. 1990), superseded by statute as stated in Young v. West Coast Indus. Rela-
tions Ass'n, 144 F.R.D. 206 (D. Del. 1992); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp.
951, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Courts applying the lenient test-while recognizing that negligence
may exist-are nonetheless reluctant to use the strict "theoretical right of redress" to excuse
the privilege holder for the possible negligence by counsel.
160. See supra text accompanying note 103.
161. See Appendices, Chart B; supra note 118.
162. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
163. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1985) is frequently cited
as the pivotal case in the development of the middle test. While Hartford does discuss and
examine the pros and cons of the lenient and strict tests, id. at 328-29, the case was decided in
the context of the inadvertent production of documents subject to work product immunity
protection and not attorney-client privilege protection. Id. at 333; see also FDIC v. Marine
Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 480-82 (E.D. Va. 1991); Kansas City Power &
Light Co. v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 174 (D. Kan. 1989); Ray
v. Cutter Lab., 746 F. Supp. 86, 87 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
164. Baker's Aid v. Hussman Food Service Co., No. CV87-0937, 1988 WL 138254, at *3-4
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1988); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House
Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 49 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (acknowledging that the document produc-
tion was "massive," as it required copying 12,000 pages, but that the producing party was
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tween these two key legal principles that surfaces whenever the issue is con-
fronted by the parties to the litigation and by the court rendering a decision
on the point of contention. The middle and alternative tests also recognize
that, depending upon the circumstances, one doctrine may necessarily take
precedence over the other.'65 Therefore, both tests recognize that situations
under no time constraints and could have reviewed the documents after they were copied and
before producing them; privilege waived), aff'd, 878 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1989); Eigenheim Bank
v. Halpern, 598 F. Supp. 988, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-
Berina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 257 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("A court must balance the possibility that
the privilege indirectly promotes free and honest communication with the policy of liberal
discovery to enhance the search for truth.").
165. See Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 483 (noting that two people devoted only one day
to prepare a production involving anywhere from 15,000 to 50,000 documents and that the
attorney did not review the documents after producing them to check for privileged documents
that may have been inadvertently produced; privilege waived); Ray, 746 F. Supp. at 88 (stating
that although a total of 900 pages of documents were eventually produced, the privileged
memorandum was turned over in a small batch of documents consisting of 157 pages; privilege
waived); United States v. Pepper's Steel & Alloy, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 641, 643 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(noting that 100,000 pages were produced in a rushed production; privilege not waived); Lig-
gett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 208 (M.D.N.C.
1986) (noting that the document discovery was extensive but the producing party had "ample"
time to screen the documents; privilege waived); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Mara-
thon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D. Neb. 1985) (providing no explanation for how one privi-
leged document was inadvertently produced out of over 75,000 documents provided; privilege
not waived).
Even in strict cases where an analysis of the "precautions" taken during the document pro-
duction is unnecessary because of the absolute outcome of the test, courts, in dicta, note the
importance of taking such precautions. See, e.g., International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 447 (D. Mass. 1988) (noting that counsel failed to segregate the
privilege documents until after they were copied). Courts view identification and segregation
of privileged documents after copying as increasing the likelihood that privileged documents
might be inadvertently produced. See Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Pop-
corn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 209 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (analyzing the question presented under the
strict and the middle tests and noting that under the middle test no procedure was instituted
regarding privileged materials; privilege waived); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss
& Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that the precautions taken by the attor-
ney barely protected the privileged documents, as he had no previous practice designating
confidential documents and there was no statement as to how a search for privileged materials
was undertaken; privilege not waived); In re Consolidated Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's
Disposition of Wisc. Steel, 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (finding that "[e]xcept for
five boxes of new material [counsel] did not screen the files for privileged documents"; privi-
leged waived); Eigenheim Bank, 598 F. Supp. at 991 (stating that the defendants' attorneys
had kept the document segregated but provided no explanation as to how it was inadvertently
produced a second time; privilege waived); Ranney-Brown Distribs., Inc. v. E.T. Barwick In-
dus., 75 F.R.D. 3, 5 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (noting there was no indication that any special effort
was made to keep a separate file for privileged materials; privilege waived); see also Ge-
orgetown Manor, Inc., v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 937 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (one privi-
leged document out -of thousands of pages of documents; privilege not waived), aff'd in part,
question certified, 991 F.2d 1533 (1 1th Cir. 1993); Kansas City Power, 133 F.R.D. at 172 (con-
cerning three privileged documents produced out of 500,000 pages of documents produced;
privilege not waived); Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Bass, No. CIV.A.88-5257, 1989 WL 9354, at *1
1993]
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involving the inadvertent production of privileged documents are not clear
cut, but require flexibility and scrutiny of the circumstances surrounding the
production of the privileged materials. Thus, the middle and alternative
tests both attempt to address directly the tension that exists between two
important doctrinal principles: a liberal discovery policy and the sanctity of
the attorney-client privilege.
Although the "time factor ' 66 is excluded from the alternative test, the
alternative test, like the middle test, should still increase the number of equi-
table outcomes. Thus, the flexibility and the totality-of-the-circumstances
position taken by the middle and alternative tests help preserve the sanctity
of the attorney-client privilege.
The middle test, like the alternative test, however, is not solely focused on
preserving the attorney-client privilege. The breadth of the test and the re-
sulting inquiry also include the strict test's preoccupation with the truth-
finding function.' 67 After applying the middle test and determining that
waiver of the privilege is the consequence, the middle test then manifests its
truth-finding objective.' 6 8 The application of the alternative test can pro-
duce the same result. The uncertainty of the outcome under the middle test
can, like the alternative test, help keep lawyers on "their toes," because the
uncertainty acts as a deterrent to the improper management of document
production. While the uncertainty of the alternative test is less than that of
the middle test, it still performs a policing function.'69
On the downside of the middle test is the existence of such a great array of
factors as are included in the test" ° which one must consider to complete
the "total picture." This can create a situation riddled with uncertainty and
unpredictability as to the outcome of the controversy. This consequence
can, to some degree, generate litigation that may have been avoided if the
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 1989) (involving several privileged letters out of numerous documents pro-
duced; privilege not waived); Standard Chartered Bank PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings (U.S.),
Inc., Ill F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (concerning one privileged sentence in a five page
document in a production of over 1,000 pages of documents; privilege not waived); Kansas-
Nebraska Natural Gas, 109 F.R.D. at 21 (concerning a single privileged exhibit out of 75,000
produced documents; privilege not waived); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp.
951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (involving four letters out of 28 files; privilege not waived); cf Baker's
Aid, 1988 WL 138254, at *4 (attorney searched several times for privileged materials; privilege
not waived).
166. Baker's Aid, 1988 WL 138254, at *4 (noting that one factor in determining whether
the privilege had been waived was "whether a substantial amount of time was taken to correct
the error").
167. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 121-42 and accompanying text.
170. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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lenient or strict tests were utilized because of their greater degree of definite-
ness '7 in outcome.
The middle test, on the other hand, presents an entirely different picture
in terms of the calculation of which option should be pursued. Given the
variety of factors'72 and the resulting greater degree of uncertainty as to the
outcome of the matter if it is judicially pursued, a party may be more willing
to expend the resources to pursue the matter. This aspect of the middle test
is aggravated because the frequent inclusion of privileged documents with
non-privileged documents173 increases the likelihood that a court will face
this issue. ' 74 Obviously, this raises the concern that additional judicial and
personal resources will be expended and possibly wasted.' 75 Furthermore,
the inherent uncertainty in the outcome when the middle test is applied
could be viewed as contravening Rule l's "speedy and efficient"' 76 objective,
as the uncertainty may spur additional litigation pertaining to the issue that
would inevitably delay the litigation. Again, the rebuttable presumption of
the alternative test is one way to lessen these practical concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
The present tests addressing the waiver consequences of the inadvertent
production of privileged documents are deficient in resolving a recurring
practical problem, prohibit uniformity among the courts, and reduce the
possibility of establishing a greater degree of certainty in resolving the issue.
Each of the three tests possesses various strengths and weaknesses. 77 The
lenient test upholds the important long-standing attorney-client privilege,
encourages candidness on the part of clients which aids in the truth-finding
goal of discovery, facilitates the efficient and just determination 78 of legal
171. See supra notes 15, 21 and accompanying text.
172. See supra text accompanying note 31.
173. See supra note 3; see also FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D.
479, 483 (E.D. Va. 1991) (involving the production of 15,000 to 50,000 documents).
174. See Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D.
Neb. 1985) (noting that in large document productions, privileged documents can "slip[ ]
through the cracks"); see also Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 481 (commenting on limited
amount of time provided for colossal document production in modem litigation).
175. See United States v. Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc., 742 F. Supp 641, 645 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (commenting that the dispute over document production required a large amount of the
court's time and attention); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (providing that one goal is for the
"inexpensive determination of every action") (emphasis added).
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules .... [S]hall be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.").
177. See supra Part III.
178. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
19931
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controversies, and recognizes that the client, not the attorney, is the proper
holder of the privilege.
179
The strict test reflects the liberal discovery policy that is a critical compo-
nent of the present litigation process as its penal-like consequence reflects the
system's commitment to discovering the "truth" and encourages attorneys
to adopt good lawyering skills.'8 ° The middle test acknowledges the ten-
sions that exist between the key doctrines confronted when addressing the
issue at hand, recognizes that the "absolutist" positions of the other two
tests may be contrary to the goals cited in Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and realizes that the integrity of the judicial system may be
undermined if the "absolutist" stances taken in the first two tests result in
inequitable decisions.''
There is a blatant need for a new, alternative test that can improve the
equitable application, and ultimately the outcome, of a legal rule while re-
ducing the tension between the critical conflicting doctrines in the context of
the inadvertent production of privileged documents. This Article proposes
the alternative test as an improvement upon each of the three current tests.
While the alternative test is not a cure-all for the waiver aspect of the inad-
vertency issue, it is a superior method of resolving the issue and should be
adopted by the federal district courts and courts of appeal. In addition, the
new test will better reconcile the conflict that exists between the two primary
legal doctrines-attorney-client privilege and a liberal discovery policy-
that are integral to this subject.
In conclusion, the new test compensates for the deficient aspects inherent
in the three tests, incorporates the attributes of each of the three tests, and
minimizes the existing doctrinal tension between the liberal discovery policy
and the attorney-client privilege.
179. See supra notes 84 and 152 and accompanying text.
180. See supra part IIIB.
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